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Gasoline Prices and Road Fatalities: International Evidence
I. INTRODUCTION
While a negative impact of gasoline prices on road fatalities has been documented for the 
United States (US), there is limited international evidence on whether road death rates are 
higher in countries with lower gasoline prices. In this study we employ data for a panel of
144 countries during 1991–2010 to present international estimates of the gasoline price 
elasticity of road fatalities. To address the potential endogeneity of gasoline prices we use 
each country’s underground oil reserves and the international crude oil price as instruments 
for that country’s gasoline price. We find that the mean long-run gasoline price elasticity of 
road deaths is in the order of -0.3 to -0.6, and that around 35,000 lives could be saved on 
roads each year by phasing out global fuel subsidies. We also use our results to estimate the 
number of deaths that could be avoided on US roads by an increase in fuel taxes.
Road safety is a leading public health issue. Road crashes are the cause of 1.3 million deaths 
every year; the ninth-leading cause of death globally and the number-one cause of death for 
people between 15 and 29 years of age (data for 2011; World Health Organization [WHO] 
2013a). Road death rates are particularly high in middle- and low-income countries, which
each year see an average of 20 and 18 deaths per 100,000 population, respectively. There are 
around 9 road deaths per 100,000 population each year in high-income countries. Up to 50 
million people worldwide also suffer non-fatal injuries each year, bringing large human and 
financial costs. The global road death toll is expected to increase to around 2.4 million per 
year by 2030 in a business-as-usual scenario, making road crashes the fifth-leading cause of 
death (WHO 2013b). Finding ways to reduce global road deaths is an increasingly important 
policy imperative.
A negative relationship between the gasoline pump price (in US cents) and annual road 
deaths per 100,000 population for a large cross-section of countries in 2010 is presented in 
Figure 1. Countries with low gasoline prices, such as Venezuela and Iran, have among the 
highest road death rates, whereas road fatalities tend to be less frequent in high-price 
countries. Figure 1 also demonstrates substantial variation in road fatality rates among 
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countries with similar gasoline prices. A number of additional variables, including per capita 
incomes, road-use laws, and road infrastructure, will be considered in explaining this 
variation.
FIGURE 1
Road Deaths and Gasoline Pump Prices, 2010
Notes: Includes 153 countries. Road death data are estimates from the WHO (2013b). These cover more countries in 2010 than the 
International Road Federation (2012) data that we use in our empirical estimations, and provide a similar estimate of the gasoline 
price elasticity of road deaths (-0.4). Gasoline price data are from GIZ (2012), as recorded in a November survey.
The large cross-country variation in retail prices for gasoline — a tradable commodity —
exists primarily because of differences in tax and subsidy policies. Venezuela had the lowest 
average price of gasoline in 2010: just 2 US cents per liter. Venezuela’s gasoline price is
substantially below the international price for crude oil (51 cents per liter in 2010; GIZ 2012),
and so involves a large subsidy for consumers. In contrast, some governments impose high 
taxes on gasoline that result in high retail pump prices. In Turkey, for instance, the average 
gasoline pump price was 252 US cents per liter in 2010, including 139 cents of taxes
(International Energy Agency [IEA] 2013a).
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There are several ways in which higher gasoline prices may reduce road deaths. It is likely 
that the principal channel is a reduction in the distance travelled in motor vehicles as people
respond to the incentive to substitute away from using a more expensive commodity.
Reduced driving decreases the exposure of both vehicle occupants and others to road crashes. 
Reductions in distance travelled may be a result of people transitioning to less transport-
intensive activities, alternative transport options, and closer workplaces. Some of these 
responses take time, so the long-run gasoline price elasticity of road deaths is likely to exceed 
the short-run elasticity. 
In addition to reducing distance travelled, higher gasoline prices might also lead to a
reduction in road deaths per kilometer driven. One reason is that, to conserve fuel, drivers
might reduce high-speed driving and also their rates of acceleration and braking.1 Another is 
that high-risk drivers, including the young, the old, and those taking leisure-related trips, are
particularly sensitive to gasoline prices (Grabowski and Morrisey 2004; Cullotta 2008; 
Morrisey and Grabowski 2011). Higher gasoline prices also result in substitution from 
heavier to lighter, more fuel-efficient, private vehicles (e.g. light trucks to automobiles), and 
lighter vehicles are associated with a lower overall number of road deaths per kilometer 
travelled (Gayer 2004; White 2004). Substitution to bus travel may also reduce overall road 
safety risks.
There are ways in which higher gasoline prices might actually lead to more rather than fewer 
road deaths. One is: by reducing congestion, higher gasoline prices can allow remaining 
drivers to travel at faster speeds (Burger and Kaffine 2009), which increases the risk of fatal 
crashes. Substitution to particularly risky types of fuel-efficient vehicles, such as 
motorcycles, may also cause additional road deaths when gasoline prices rise (Hyatt et al. 
2009; Wilson et al. 2009).2
Existing evidence for the US indicates that higher gasoline prices reduce road fatalities and/or 
crashes (Leigh and Wilkinson 1991; Haughton and Sarkar 1996; Grabowski and Morrisey 
2004, 2006; Sivak 2009; Chi et al. 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013a, 2013b; Montour 2011). As for 
gasoline demand itself, the response of road deaths to gasoline prices in the US is inelastic. 
1 Speeds over 80 kilometers per hour are generally associated with lower fuel efficiency (U.S. Department of 
Energy 2013). The Congressional Budget Office (2008) reports that higher gasoline prices indeed cause drivers 
on uncongested Californian roads to slightly reduce their speeds.
2 Recent evidence on the safety risks associated with motorcycle travel is provided by Nishitateno and Burke 
(2014).
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Grabowski and Morrisey (2004), for instance, use data for 48 US states for the period 1983–
2000 and find a gasoline price elasticity of road fatalities of -0.3 when responses over a two-
year period are considered.
Most international studies on the determinants of road fatalities (e.g. Page 2001; Noland 
2005; Anwaar et al. 2012) concentrate on other issues, although Litman (2012) presents a
scatterplot for 16 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries that shows a negative association between average gasoline prices and traffic 
fatality rates. As far as we are aware, there has been no prior international estimate of the 
gasoline price elasticity of road deaths.
II. APPROACH
We estimate the following specification:
(1) lnDc,t = Į + ȕ1lnGc,t + ȕ2lnYc,t + ȕ3lnPc,t + ȖXc,t + Gc + Zt + Hc,t
where D is road deaths in country c in year t, G is the gasoline price in year-2010 US cents, Y
is gross domestic product (GDP) in real purchasing power parity-adjusted US dollars, P is 
population, and X is a vector of additional controls included in later estimations. Gc and Zt are 
country and year fixed effects, and H is an error term. We also present specifications that 
control for country-specific time trends.
Our primary interest is in identifying the long-run gasoline price elasticity of road deaths.3 To 
this end we initially estimate Equation (1) for a cross-section of countries in the year 2010, as 
so-called “between variation” has a natural long-run interpretation. We then proceed to panel 
estimates using the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), between, and fixed-effects 
estimators. The between estimator uses average data for each country and provides estimates 
of long-run effects (Baltagi and Griffin 1983, 1984; Pesaran and Smith 1995; Pirotte 1999, 
2003; Baltagi 2008; Stern 2010). Fixed-effects estimations control for time-invariant factors 
such as the extent of mountainous terrain, but when a static fixed-effects equation is 
estimated the coefficients represent shorter-run effects. To explore the dynamics of the 
response to higher gasoline prices and for a further estimate of the long-run gasoline price 
elasticity of road deaths, we then table results for distributed lag specifications (with country 
fixed effects). For checks on the importance of functional form, we also estimate negative 
3 The long-run response is more important from a policy viewpoint than the short-run response.
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binomial models (with and without country fixed effects) and models using per capita 
measures of road deaths and GDP.4
An issue of concern is that the gasoline price term in Equation (1) may be correlated with the 
error term. The level of demand for road transport might have a material effect on a country’s
average gasoline pump price, for instance, while also affecting road deaths (Grabowski and 
Morrisey 2004, 2006; Morrisey and Grabowski 2011). Alternatively, governments may 
impose higher gasoline taxes in countries with low demand for road use, as argued by 
Hammar et al. (2004). It is also possible that the set of factors affecting gasoline tax/subsidy 
policies might include road safety concerns. Perhaps even more importantly, there might be 
omitted policy variables that are associated with gasoline prices: interventionist governments 
might tax gasoline and have strict road rules, for example. These concerns mean that we 
cannot be sure that single-equation estimation of Equation (1) will produce unbiased and 
consistent estimates of the effect of gasoline prices on road deaths.
To address the potential endogeneity of gasoline prices we present estimates using the two 
supply-side instruments for the gasoline price employed by Burke and Nishitateno (2013) in 
their recent study of the gasoline price elasticity of demand. The first is a country’s per capita 
underground oil reserves, as oil-rich countries such as Venezuela are more likely to subsidize
gasoline and oil-poor countries such as the Republic of Korea are more likely to tax it. The 
second is a measure of the annual average international crude oil price, as higher crude oil 
prices flow through to higher gasoline pump prices in most countries. It is likely that our 
instruments affect road deaths via gasoline prices rather than other channels.
The advantage of using two instruments is that doing so allows verification of the effect of 
gasoline prices on road deaths using independent sources of variation in gasoline prices. The 
exclusion restrictions are that oil reserves and the global oil price are not correlated with 
unobserved determinants of road deaths (across countries and over time, respectively). In 
addition to using the instruments separately we also present estimates using both instruments 
4 Negative binomial models are often used in studies of road deaths (see, for instance, the papers of Chi et al.). 
As will be documented, negative binomial models provide long-run gasoline price elasticities of road deaths that 
fall within our reported range. Our focus is primarily on linear models (in log-log form) because these are better 
suited to an instrumental variable context.
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together. Existing studies on the effect of gasoline prices on road deaths in the US do not use 
instrumental variable (IV) approaches.5
Our estimates are for a panel of 144 countries for 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 
2006, 2008, and 2010: ten years for which average gasoline price data are available from the 
November surveys of GIZ (2012). Our data on road fatalities are primarily from the
International Road Federation [IRF] (2012) and include all reported deaths that occur within 
30 days of a road crash. Alternative estimates of road deaths in 2010 from the WHO (2013b), 
as used in Figure 1, provide similar results. We focus on fatalities because international data 
on non-fatal road crashes are less reliable (Luoma and Sivak 2007; Sauerzapf et al. 2010; 
WHO 2013b). Nevertheless, the accuracy of the data on road deaths is likely to vary. If the 
reporting of road deaths improves in a way that is correlated with economic development, our 
GDP variable will control for some data quality differences. Because of missing data, on 
average each country is included in our sample for 5.8 of the ten years. The countries in our 
sample represented 94% of the world’s population in 2010. A full list of data sources is in the 
Appendix. 
III. RESULTS
A. Main Specifications
Results for single-equation specifications, controlling for GDP and population, are in Table 1.
Column 1 is for a year-2010 cross-section of countries, and indicates that a 1% higher 
gasoline price on average reduces road fatalities by 0.4%. Cross-sectional estimates utilize 
only between variation, and so this is a first estimate of the long-run effect of gasoline prices 
on road deaths. Columns 2 and 3 present results using the pooled OLS (with year dummies) 
and between estimators. The point estimates of the gasoline price elasticity of road deaths are 
slightly smaller (-0.3), but remain distinguishable from zero at the 1% significance level. 
Column 4 of Table 1 controls for both year and country fixed effects, which removes most of 
the variation in gasoline prices in our sample.6 This makes it difficult for within-country 
gasoline price movements to affect road deaths. Static models relying on only within 
variation are also likely to provide short-run effects because of the under-specification of 
dynamics (Baltagi 2008). Likely as a result of these factors, the fixed-effects estimate in 
5 In their study of Los Angeles freeway speeds, Burger and Kaffine (2009) also use the world oil price to 
instrument the local gasoline price. Grabowski and Morrisey (2006) do not use an IV approach in their study of 
road deaths but hope that state gasoline taxes provide an exogenous source of variation in gasoline prices. 
6 A regression of log gasoline price on country and year dummies has an R2 of 0.90.
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column 4 is insignificant. We obtain a significant coefficient in the fixed-effects specification 
in column 5 which includes a linear time trend for each country in the sample.
TABLE 1
Results for Single-Equation Specifications
Dependent variable: Ln Road deaths
Specification 2010 Pooled Between Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln Gasoline price -0.40*** -0.30*** -0.35*** 0.01 -0.10*
(0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06)
Ln GDP 0.00 0.17*** 0.23*** 0.34** 0.34***
(0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.15) (0.10)
Ln Population 0.98*** 0.79*** 0.72*** 1.09** 0.12
(0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.46) (0.37)
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No
Country-specific time trends No No No No Yes
R2 0.87 0.86 0.88 0.16 0.61
Observations 101 837 837 837 837
Countries 101 144 144 144 144
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level (except 
for the between estimate). The R2s reflect the power of the explanatory variables and year dummies (but not the country fixed 
effects). Coefficients on constants not reported.
Table 2 shows our IV results. Our cross-sectional and panel estimates instrumenting with per 
capita oil reserves (columns 1-2) indicate that higher gasoline prices significantly reduce road 
deaths, with the cross-sectional estimate providing an elasticity of -0.3. We are prevented 
from controlling for country fixed effects when instrumenting with oil reserves per capita as 
there is almost no useful time-series variation in per capita oil reserves. Columns 3 and 4
instrument with the log real international crude oil price. Country-specific linear time trends
are included instead of year dummies, as year dummies would be perfectly collinear with our 
instrument.7 The gasoline price elasticities in these estimates are -0.5 and -0.4. It is reassuring 
that we obtain similar results using different instruments. Column 5 uses both instruments 
and obtains a gasoline price elasticity of road deaths of -0.5.
Column 6 of Table 2 uses both instruments and controls for the full set of controls that will be 
used in Table 4. The results suggest a stronger negative effect of gasoline prices on road 
7 Results are similar without these country-specific time trends.
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deaths, with an elasticity of -0.9. Given the smaller sample size, weaker first-stage 
identification, and the possibility that some of the controls could themselves be endogenous,
we do not include the column 6 estimate in our “headline” results. The robustness of our IV 
estimates to the addition of controls such as road infrastructure variables does, however, 
reduce the concern that the result is driven by a violation of the IV exclusion restriction.
TABLE 2
Instrumental Variable Results
Dependent variable: Ln Road deaths
Instrument/s Oil reserves per capita (‘000 tonnes)
Ln Real world
oil price Both Both
Specification 2010 Pooled Pooled Fixed effects Pooled
Pooled, with 
full set of 
controls from 
Table 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln Gasoline price -0.31*** -0.24*** -0.51*** -0.39** -0.46*** -0.91***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.12) (0.16) (0.08) (0.20)
Ln GDP 0.00 0.16*** 0.14** 0.46*** 0.14** 0.00
(0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.12) (0.06) (0.09)
Ln Population 0.98*** 0.79*** 0.92*** 0.02 0.92*** 1.00***
(0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.39) (0.08) (0.10)
Year fixed effects No Yes No No No No
Country-specific time trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.87 0.86 0.95 0.58 0.95 0.99
First stage
Coefficient on Oil reserves per capita -0.49*** -0.33*** - - -0.69*** -0.79***
Coefficient on Ln Real world oil price - - 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.28*** 0.13***
Partial R2 on instrument/s 0.23 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.26 0.19
F statistic on instrument/s 12.31 12.71 108.75 59.05 59.79 14.41
Robust endogeneity test p-value 0.45 0.50 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.00
Sargan over-identification test p-value - - - - 0.35 0.36
Observations 101 837 837 830 837 408
Countries 101 144 144 137 144 91
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The R2s
reflect the power of the explanatory variables (except country fixed effects). Coefficients on constants and the additional controls in 
column 6 are not reported. The instrumented variable is the log gasoline price. The null of weak instruments is rejected if the F statistic 
on the instrument/s exceeds the Stock-Yogo critical value. The Stock-Yogo 5% critical value for 10% (15%) maximal IV size is 16.38 
(8.96) with one instrument and 19.93 (11.59) with two instruments. The overidentification test is for specifications with robust but 
unclustered standard errors. Column 4 drops seven singletons.
Stock and Yogo (2005) tests indicate that our instruments provide adequate identification 
strength. Specifically, the null hypothesis of 15% maximal IV size is rejected in each of the 
IV specifications. The first-stage coefficients, as expected, indicate that oil reserves and the 
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oil price are negatively and positively correlated with the gasoline price, respectively.8
Overidentification tests in columns 5–6 do not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments 
are valid. The IV results instrumenting with oil reserves per capita (columns 1–2) are similar 
to the single-equation estimates, meaning that endogeneity tests fail to reject the null that the 
log gasoline price is exogenous.9 In contrast, endogeneity tests in columns 3–6 suggest that 
there is due cause to treat gasoline prices as endogenous.
The estimated coefficients for the control variables in Tables 1 and 2 are of interest. As 
expected, countries with larger populations typically have more road deaths, which is merely 
a scale effect. The panel results indicate that countries with larger economies also on average 
have more road fatalities, presumably because more people can afford private road vehicle 
travel. The income elasticities are smaller than the income elasticities of gasoline 
consumption of around +1.0 obtained by Burke and Nishitateno (2013), likely because richer 
countries dedicate more resources to improving road safety. A non-linear relationship 
between GDP per capita and road deaths will be considered in coming specifications.
Table 3 shows distributed-lag estimates with country and year fixed effects. Because these 
rely solely on within variation, we commence the gasoline price terms from year t-1 to allow 
time for responses to November prices. As a result, our estimation sample here extends to 
2009 rather than 2010. Lags are included for every second year given the biennial nature of 
GIZ’s gasoline price data, and the sample reduces with each additional lag. The long-run 
gasoline price elasticity is the sum of the coefficients for each gasoline price term. 
The results in Table 3 provide an estimate of the long-run gasoline price elasticity of -0.6
when lags to year t-9 are considered (significant at the 10% level). Similar, and statistically 
stronger, long-run multipliers are obtained in pooled OLS and between estimates of 
distributed lag models. We also find generally similar estimates in specifications with 
country-specific time trends (see base of Table 3). We cannot rule out that even larger 
elasticities may be obtained from distributed lag models once longer time-series are available.
8 The first stage in column 5 of Table 2 indicates that the partial effect of a 1% increase in the real world oil 
price is on average a 0.3% increase in the domestic gasoline price, holding other factors constant. Having an 
additional tonne of in-ground oil reserves per capita on average reduces the local gasoline price by 0.07%.
9 Burger and Kaffine’s (2009) results on the effects of gasoline prices on rush-hour vehicle speed and Burke and 
Nishitateno’s (2013) estimates of the gasoline price elasticity of demand are also similar across their OLS and 
IV specifications.
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TABLE 3
Distributed Lag Results
Dependent variable: Ln Road deaths
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln Gasoline pricet-1 -0.04 0.02 0.13 0.05 -0.06
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.17)
Ln Gasoline pricet-3 -0.12 -0.23* -0.04 0.17
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.19)
Ln Gasoline pricet-5 -0.19*** -0.17 -0.34*
(0.07) (0.11) (0.19)
Ln Gasoline pricet-7 -0.20** -0.34**
(0.09) (0.17)
Ln Gasoline pricet-9 -0.06
(0.14)
Ln GDPt 0.28* 0.31* 0.37*** 0.53** 0.71*
(0.16) (0.17) (0.11) (0.26) (0.40)
Ln Populationt 1.19** 1.11* 0.42 0.19 0.26
(0.48) (0.61) (0.64) (0.85) (0.94)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Long-run gasoline price elasticity -0.04 -0.10 -0.29** -0.36* -0.63*
Same elasticity: Pooled OLS estimate -0.31*** -0.35*** -0.39*** -0.47*** -0.57***
Same elasticity: Between estimate -0.27*** -0.29*** -0.40*** -0.37*** -0.59***
Same elasticity: Estimate with country-specific time 
trends (as well as country fixed effects) -0.06 -0.12 -0.35** -0.58** -0.96**
R2 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.16
Observations 762 569 442 336 237
Years 1992-2009 1994-2009 1996-2009 2005-2009 2007-2009
Countries 149 145 140 133 129
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. 
The R2s reflect the power of the explanatory variables and year dummies (but not the country fixed effects). Coefficients on 
constants not reported.
Based on our single-equation and IV estimates using between variation in Tables 1–2 and our 
estimates using distributed lags in Table 3, we conclude that the average long-run gasoline 
price elasticity of road deaths is likely in the order of -0.3 to -0.6. This is an inelastic 
response, meaning that higher gasoline prices do reduce road deaths, but in a less-than-
proportionate manner. Burke and Nishitateno (2013) obtained similar estimates of the long-
run gasoline price elasticity of demand, suggesting that our result is primarily related to the 
relationship between gasoline prices and the propensity for road travel. We do not have 
sufficient data for our international sample to decompose the effects of gasoline prices on
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road deaths into specific channels such as distance travelled or travel speeds, although such 
research would be of interest when data permit.10
B. Robustness
In some countries a large share of the vehicle fleet runs on diesel rather than gasoline. Table 4
presents estimates using the average of the gasoline and diesel prices and controlling for 
additional variables: land area, the length of each country’s road network, the share of roads 
that is paved, the vehicle and motorcycle stocks, measures of the importance of rail and air 
transport, the share of the population aged 15–24 (who are typically overrepresented in road 
crashes), the urban population share, alcohol consumption, blood alcohol limits for drivers, 
the maximum speed in urban areas, measures of the rule of law and control of corruption, 
economic growth, and infant mortality. Controlling for road infrastructure variables helps to 
address the concern that our main result operates via the additional road funding that is 
possible when gasoline taxes are high. The log infant mortality rate is included as a proxy of 
overall health conditions in each country (noting that few infant deaths are caused by road 
crashes). We show between estimates for static models given our desires to estimate long-run 
effects and maximize sample size. 
The results in Table 4 provide fuel price elasticities of road deaths of -0.3 to -0.45 (significant 
at the 1% level) and suggest that fuel prices are one of the most statistically robust cross-
country determinants of road death rates. Countries with better control of corruption, higher 
dependence on air travel, lower alcohol consumption and stricter speed laws have fewer road 
deaths. Interestingly, countries with better “rule of law” ratings have more road deaths
(holding all other variables, including corruption, constant), perhaps because reporting of 
road deaths is more complete. Once the full set of other variables has been controlled for, we
find no evidence that the number of motor vehicles in each country is a strong predictor of 
road deaths.11
10 The International Road Federation (2012) and OECD (2013a) provide some international data on vehicle or 
passenger kilometers travelled, but these are unavailable for the majority of our sample and are of questionable 
quality. The OECD (2013b) notes that there is no common international method for calculating passenger 
distance travelled in road vehicles. Studies of the US provide somewhat conflicting results on how gasoline 
prices affect road deaths: Grabowski and Morrisey (2004) find that the effect of higher gasoline prices on road 
deaths operates via a reduction in vehicle distance travelled, whereas Haughton and Sarkar (1996), Grabowski 
and Morrisey (2006), Chi et al. (2010, 2013b), and Montour (2011) report that there is also a reduction in road 
deaths per vehicle-kilometer travelled.
11 In regressions with a smaller set of controls, a positive and significant effect of motor vehicle numbers on 
road deaths is obtained. Estimates of ȕ1 remain similar.
12
TABLE 4
Results with Additional Controls
Dependent variable: Ln Road deaths. Estimator: Between
(1) (2) (3)
Ln Average gasoline and diesel price -0.31*** -0.41***
(0.08) (0.13)
Ln Gasoline price -0.45***
(0.13)
Ln GDP 0.23*** 0.23 0.21
(0.04) (0.15) (0.15)
Ln Population 0.72*** 0.67*** 0.71***
(0.05) (0.13) (0.13)
Ln Land area 0.05 0.05
(0.05) (0.05)
Ln Road distance 0.04 0.04
(0.10) (0.10)
Paved road share (%) 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Ln Motor vehicle stock (4+ wheels) 0.11 0.09
(0.12) (0.12)
Ln Motorcycle stock -0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Rail share of energy used in transport (%) 0.01 0.01(0.01) (0.01)
Ln Air passengers -0.11* -0.11*
(0.07) (0.06)
Population aged 15-24 (%) 0.03 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
Urban population (%) -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Ln Alcohol consumption per adult 0.11** 0.11**(0.05) (0.05)
Blood alcohol limit for drivers in 2011 1.11 1.22
(2.25) (2.24)
Maximum speed in urban areas in 2011 0.01*** 0.01**
(0.00) (0.00)
Rule of law score 0.40** 0.40**
(0.20) (0.20)
Control of corruption score -0.36** -0.37**
(0.17) (0.17)
Economic growth rate (%) -0.02** -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01)
Ln Infant mortality rate 0.02 -0.02
(0.14) (0.14)
R2 0.88 0.95 0.95
Observations 832 408 408
Countries 144 91 91
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Coefficients on constants not reported. Log 
Alcohol consumption per adult is lagged one year to increase sample size.
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The effect of gasoline prices on road deaths may operate via some of the control variables in 
Table 4, including GDP. We obtain similar estimates for the gasoline price term if the 
controls are lagged, however. Pooled OLS estimates also provide similar results (although 
with slightly smaller point estimates of the gasoline price elasticity of road deaths). Because
we control for log real GDP, our coefficient estimates for ȕ1 are identical if our gasoline price 
measure is scaled by real GDP. While our list of controls in Table 4 is long, there are many 
other factors that influence road safety. Current data constraints for our large international 
sample mean that we leave the task of including additional control variables to future 
research, perhaps for a smaller set of countries.12
Table 5 presents results using per capita measures of road deaths and GDP, and controlling 
for population density instead of population. The Table also shows estimates for sub-samples 
of OECD and non-OECD countries and an estimate controlling for regional dummies. The 
results are similar to those in Table 1, confirming that it makes little difference if variables 
are in total or per capita terms.13 Column 2 controls for the square of log GDP per capita to 
account for the road deaths Kuznets curve (see, for instance, Law et al. 2011). The results 
suggest that the road death rate typically increases until a mid-range GDP per capita, and 
subsequently falls (holding other factors constant). We continue to observe a negative and 
statistically significant gasoline price elasticity of road deaths. 
Column 3 of Table 5 includes the squared log gasoline price to test whether the gasoline price 
elasticity of road deaths varies at different gasoline price levels. Road deaths appear to be 
more responsive to changes in the gasoline price when the price is already high. The 
estimated gasoline price elasticity of road deaths at the 25th-percentile gasoline price is -0.5,
increasing to -0.8 at the 75th percentile.14 Column 4 includes an interaction between the log 
gasoline price and log GDP per capita. The estimate provides no evidence that the gasoline 
price elasticity of road deaths varies by development level. We also obtain statistically 
significant estimates of the effect of gasoline prices on road deaths for sub-sets of OECD and 
non-OECD countries (columns 5 and 6). Data on road fatalities are likely to be more reliable 
12 We obtain similar gasoline price elasticities of road deaths in specifications that also control for seatbelt usage 
rates, rural road speed limits, or expert assessments of the effectiveness of helmet law enforcement (all 
measured in 2011; WHO 2013b, 2013d). Because data limitations further reduce our sample, we omit these 
controls from Table 4.
13 Because the dependent variable is just a rescaling by population, the effect of including our additional control 
variables in this regression is the same as in Table 4.
14 In unreported specifications we find that the gasoline price elasticity of road deaths is similar when changes in 
gasoline prices are either small or large.
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for OECD countries, and so the gasoline price elasticity of road deaths of -0.5 for the OECD 
sub-sample increases our confidence in the main results. Column 7 controls for regional 
dummy variables, which allows some time-invariant regional-specific characteristics such as 
driving culture to be considered. The results are similar. 
TABLE 5
Estimates for Road Deaths per 100,000 Population
Dependent variable: Ln Road deaths per 100,000 population. Estimator: Between
Sample Full Full Full Full OECD Non-OECD
Full, with 
regional 
dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ln Gasoline price
-0.30*** -0.24*** 1.26*** -0.80 -0.47* -0.17* -0.28***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.45) (0.69) (0.24) (0.10) (0.09)
Ln GDP per capita
0.26*** 2.88*** 0.29*** 0.02 -0.09 0.39*** 0.20***
(0.04) (0.49) (0.04) (0.34) (0.15) (0.06) (0.06)
Ln Population density
-0.09*** -0.07** -0.09*** -0.09*** 0.06 -0.15*** -0.09**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
(Ln GDP per capita)2
-0.15***
(0.03)
(Ln Gasoline price)2
-0.22***
(0.06)
Ln Gasoline price* 
Ln GDP per capita
0.05
(0.08)
GDP per capita at turning 
point ($) - 12,828 - - - - -
Estimated gasoline price elasticity for xth-percentile gasoline price
25th - - -0.52*** - - - -
50th - - -0.70*** - - - -
75th - - -0.83*** - - - -
R2 0.29 0.41 0.35 0.30 0.16 0.39 0.33
Observations 837 837 837 837 270 567 837
Countries 144 144 144 144 34 110 144
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Coefficients on constants not reported. The OECD sub-sample 
includes all 34 current member countries. The regional dummies are based on the seven World Bank (2013a) regions. Year 
dummies are not included because the between estimator is being employed.
Table 6 presents cross-section, pooled and fixed-effect negative binomial estimates. Negative 
binomial models are suited to a count dependent variable and are preferred over Poisson 
models because our road death data exhibit over-dispersion (variance exceeds the mean). As 
in Table 5, we use road deaths weighted by population (now in unlogged form). The 
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coefficients for the gasoline price, which can again be interpreted as elasticities, are 
significantly different from zero, and range from -0.4 (using between variation in the cross-
sectional estimate) to -0.2 (using static within variation, and so likely representing a shorter-
run effect). An unreported fixed-effect negative binomial model with additional lags provides 
a long-run gasoline price elasticity of road deaths of -0.6 (significant at the 5% level). In an 
additional check — available on request — we also estimated an IV negative binomial 
model, obtaining similar results to our linear IV estimates (but for which weak instrument test 
and other information is not available). In short, results using negative binominal models fall 
within our reported range.
TABLE 6
Negative Binomial Models
Dependent variable: Road deaths per 100,000 population
Sample 2010 Pooled
Pooled, with full 
set of controls 
from Table 4
Pooled, with 
country fixed 
effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln Gasoline price -0.42*** -0.25*** -0.29*** -0.17***
(0.09) (0.07) (0.11) (0.06)
Ln GDP per capita 2.79*** 2.43*** 3.21*** 2.55**
(0.67) (0.45) (0.61) (0.99)
Ln Population density -0.08** -0.08*** -0.03 0.19
(0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (0.21)
(Ln GDP per capita)2 -0.16*** -0.13*** -0.18*** -0.12**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
GDP per capita at turning point ($) 7,206 11,289 9,537 30,371
Observations 101 837 408 830
Countries 101 144 91 137
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. 
Column 4 results obtained by including country dummies in a negative binomial estimation. Coefficients on constants not 
reported.
A lingering concern may be that there are additional time-varying policies affecting road 
deaths that are not possible to control for, and may be correlated with gasoline prices. While
our specifications generally have relatively high R2 values, there are clearly other variables 
(such as road safety advertising campaigns) that are likely to affect road deaths. It is 
important to note, however, that omitted variables could only be causing a serious
identification problem across our full suite of estimates if they are correlated with gasoline 
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prices (in our single-equation estimates) and each of our instruments (in our various IV 
estimates). This is unlikely. The world oil price is unlikely to be affected by or have any 
short-term influence on road safety policies, for instance. Our IV strategy, together with our 
use of numerous controls (alcohol consumption; country fixed effects; country-by-country 
time trends, regional dummies; etc), make us confident that our results represent consistent 
estimates of the causal effect of gasoline prices on road deaths.
It is important to explicitly note that many other factors, including those that we have not 
been able to represent in our estimations, also have important influences on road death rates. 
There are many, sad, stories behind individual road crashes. There is also substantial 
evidence that specific interventions such as helmet laws can reduce road death rates (e.g. 
Passmore et al. 2010). The results in this paper do not challenge this evidence. Instead, the 
results provide macro-level guidance on one economic variable — the price of gasoline —
that has a macro-level effect on road deaths. This variable is amenable to policy.
IV. ESTIMATING THE NUMBER OF AVOIDED DEATHS 
FROM FUEL PRICE REFORM
Some countries, particularly the oil-rich, provide large price subsidies to consumers of 
gasoline. Table 7 presents estimates of the number of road deaths that could be avoided if 
countries with gasoline prices lower than those in the US (76 cents per liter in 2010) 
increased their average gasoline price to the US level. The estimates are based on a 
conservative long-run gasoline price elasticity of road deaths of -0.4 (e.g. column 1 of Table 
1). Like GIZ (2012), we consider the gasoline price in the US — the lowest of all OECD 
countries — as the divider between countries that subsidize gasoline consumption and the 
rest. While the US does apply state and federal taxes on gasoline, these could be considered 
to be the minimum required to adequately cover road infrastructure and externality costs 
(GIZ 2012). There are alternative approaches that could be used to measure the size of fuel 
subsidies (e.g. Davis 2014).
The results in Table 7 suggest that around 35,000 lives per annum could be saved in 23 
countries by removing the subsidies that were in place in 2010.15 35,000 lives is 3% of the 
global annual road death toll. The countries in which fuel subsidy reform offers the largest 
15 These are ceteris paribus estimates for the year 2010. Population and GDP growth will concurrently place 
upward pressure on road deaths in most of these countries. There is also the chance that subsidy removal could 
lower the global oil price and therefore increase road deaths in other countries, but the magnitudes involved in 
such a process are difficult to model.
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potential reductions in road deaths are Iran (10,600 avoided deaths per year) and Venezuela
(>5,000 avoided deaths per year). The removal of fuel subsidies would also result in large 
reductions in road deaths in Indonesia (4,500), Nigeria (4,200), Saudi Arabia (2,700), Egypt 
(1,800), and Algeria (1,700).16
How many road deaths could be avoided if the US itself had higher taxes on gasoline? A
simulation using our results implies that around 8,500 lives per year could be saved if US 
gasoline taxes were increased to bring the US gasoline price to the United Kingdom (UK) 
level (192 cents per liter in 2010). This would reduce US road fatalities by around a quarter. 
A reduction of this magnitude is not historically infeasible: the number of annual road deaths 
in the US fell by 9,600 (17%) as gasoline prices spiked during the years 1973–1975, for 
instance (Leigh and Geraghty 2008). Annual road deaths in the US also reduced by 9,800 
between 2006 and 2010 as gasoline prices increased and the economy entered recession (and
due to other factors; Sivak and Schoettle 2010). 
How many more road deaths would occur if countries that currently have high gasoline taxes 
move down to US-level gasoline prices? The case of the UK is illustrative. Our estimates 
indicate that the UK would have around 1,800 additional road deaths per year if it had US-
level gasoline prices, a 95% increase over current levels. The UK’s road death toll has been 
falling over recent years; our estimates indicate that moving to US-level prices would return
the country to a circa-1995 road death toll.
We ask one final question: How large a role has increases in real gasoline prices played in the 
reductions in road deaths that have been achieved in most developed countries? The answer is 
that higher gasoline prices have had a material effect in reducing road deaths, but are
typically not the majority of the story. This results from the relative inelasticity of road deaths 
to gasoline prices. An example will help. During 2002–2010, France’s annual road death toll 
fell from around 7,700 to around 4,000. During this period, real gasoline pump prices in 
France increased by 57%. Our estimates suggest that the contribution of this price increase to 
the reduction in France’s road death toll is about 800 annual road deaths, or around 20%. 
Other factors explain the majority of the reduction in road deaths in France in recent years. 
Similar is true of most other developed countries.17
16 Several of the countries listed in Table 7 (e.g. Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria) have reduced gasoline subsidies since 
2010. Future researchers might explore the effects of these recent subsidy reductions on road safety. 
17 Our estimates indicate that only 13% of the previously-mentioned reduction in US road deaths over the period 
2006-2010 was due to rising gasoline prices.
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TABLE 7
Gasoline-Subsidizing Countries: Estimated Road Deaths Avoided 
if Gasoline Price Were Equal to the Level in the United States
(76 cents per liter, 2010)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Country Gasoline pump price (US cents)
Road deaths
per 100,000 
population 
(WHO, 2013b)
Road deaths 
(WHO, 2013b)
Estimate: 
avoided road deaths 
if gasoline price were 
76 US cents
Venezuela 2 37 10,791 >5,000
Iran 10 34 25,224 10,600
Saudi Arabia 16 25 6,800 2,700
Libya 17 n.a. n.a. 584
Qatar 19 14 247 158
Bahrain 21 11 132 103
Turkmenistan 22 n.a. n.a. 382
Kuwait 23 17 452 202
Oman 31 30 845 144
Algeria 32 n.a. n.a. 1,700
Yemen 35 24 5,698 1,000
Brunei Darussalam 39 7 27 15
Nigeria 44 34 53,339 4,200
United Arab Emirates 47 13 956 210
Egypt 48 13 10,729 1,800
Indonesia 51 18 42,434 4,500
Ecuador 53 27 3,911 259
Malaysia 59 25 7,085 345
Sudan 62 25 10,935 331
Angola 65 23 4,407 141
Bolivia 70 19 1,910 38
Kazakhstan 71 22 3,514 51
Azerbaijan 75 13 1,202 6
Sum for 23 countries ~35,000
Notes: Countries are ordered by column 2 value. Column 5 estimates use a gasoline price elasticity of road deaths of -
0.4 and are rounded to the nearest hundred if >1,000. Estimates are capped at ">5,000" for Venezuela given 
the imprecision associated with estimates using such large price changes. Regression estimates use IRF 
reported road death data rather than the WHO death estimates. The WHO data are their estimates and are 
shown because they provide superior country coverage in 2010 (only).
V. CONCLUSION
This study has utilized the substantial variation in international gasoline pump prices to 
examine the effect of gasoline prices on the number of people dying in road crashes. Our 
results indicate that higher gasoline prices significantly reduce road deaths, with our point 
estimates of the mean long-run gasoline price elasticity of road deaths lying between -0.3 and 
-0.6. The effect is an inelastic one, as also obtained in studies of the US (e.g. Grabowski and 
Morrisey 2004).
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The international community is mobilizing a number of strategies to improve road safety
during the United Nations’ Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011–2020. The Plan for the
Decade of Action (WHO 2010) is silent on the potential role of fuel pricing. Reductions in 
fuel subsidies and increases in fuel taxes could, however, make a large contribution to the 
Plan’s objectives. Countries providing the largest fuel subsidies are particularly compelling 
candidates for reform. Globally, around 35,000 road deaths could be avoided each year by the 
removal of the fuel subsidies that were in place in 2010.
Finally, there are likely to be large changes in road transport over coming decades. Moving 
toward non-oil powered vehicles may involve a reduction in the marginal cost of driving. If 
so, our results suggest that this could feed into higher road death rates. At the same time, 
however, vehicle safety will continue improving. The economic and other factors affecting 
road death rates will remain a stimulating field of research.
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS
Road deaths: Number of reported deaths that occur within 30 days of a road crash. Includes all 
deaths (e.g. of vehicle occupants, motorcyclists, cyclists, and pedestrians). International Road 
Federation (2012). Data for nine countries were supplemented with figures from the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (2013a) and the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (2013).
Gasoline price: Average retail gasoline pump price in year-2010 US cents per liter. Prices were 
collected by GIZ (2012) in mid-November surveys. Data are for unleaded Octane 95 gasoline. 
Indonesia’s price is for subsidized gasoline. The US GDP deflator from the World Bank (2013a)
was used to deflate prices.
GDP: Expenditure-side real GDP at chained purchasing power parities, in 2005 $US. Feenstra et al. 
(2013).
Population: Total population, in people. Feenstra et al. (2013).
Oil reserves per capita: Proved underground reserves of crude oil, thousand tonnes per capita. U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (2011). One year’s lag or lead used for a small number of 
missing observations.
Real world oil price: Average cost of total crude imports of the members of the IEA in year-2010 US 
dollars per barrel. IEA (2013a). The US GDP deflator from the World Bank (2013a) was used to 
deflate prices.
Average gasoline and diesel price: Simple average of the gasoline and diesel retail pump prices in 
year-2010 US cents per liter. Prices were collected by GIZ (2012) in mid-November surveys. 
Gasoline prices are for unleaded Octane 95 gasoline. Indonesia’s gasoline price is for subsidized 
gasoline. The US GDP deflator from the World Bank (2013a) was used to deflate prices.
Land area: A country's total land area, excluding inland water bodies, national claims to continental 
shelf, and exclusive economic zones, in square kilometers. World Bank (2013a).
Road distance: Length of the total road network, in kilometers. International Road Federation (2012).
Data linearly interpolated.
Paved road share (%): % of road length that is surfaced with crushed stone, hydrocarbon binder, 
bituminized agents, concrete, or cobblestones. International Road Federation (2012). Data linearly 
interpolated.
Motor vehicle stock (4+ wheels): Number of motor vehicles with 4 or more wheels. Includes cars, 
buses, lorries, and vans. International Road Federation (2012). Several apparent errors were 
removed. Data linearly interpolated.
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Motorcycle stock: Two- or three-wheeled road motor vehicles. International Road Federation (2012).
Several apparent errors were removed. Data linearly interpolated.
Rail share of energy used in transport (%): % share of rail sector’s energy use in total energy used in
the road, rail, and domestic aviation sectors. IEA (2013b).
Air passengers: Domestic and international passengers of air carriers registered in the country. World 
Bank (2013a).
Population aged 15-24 (%): % of population aged 15-24. Five-yearly United Nations (2010) data on
the 15-24 year old population were linearly interpolated. Data on total population from Feenstra et 
al. (2013).
Urban population (%): People living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices as a share 
of the total population. World Bank (2013a).
Alcohol consumption per adult: Annual alcohol consumption (in liters of pure alcohol) per adult (age 
15+). WHO (2013c). 
Blood alcohol limit for drivers in 2011: Legal blood alcohol concentration (BAC) for general drivers 
in 2011 (or nearby year), expressed as a %. This variable is missing for countries with no limit 
(which only slightly reduces the sample). This variable is not time varying. WHO (2013d).
Maximum speed in urban areas in 2011: Maximum speed limit for cars on residential roads in 2011,
in kilometers per hour. This variable is not time varying. WHO (2013d).
Rule of law score: A measure of perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Approximate possible 
range is -2.5 (worst) to 2.5 (best). World Bank (2013b).
Control of corruption score: A measure of perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture 
of the state by elites and private interests. Approximate possible range is -2.5 (worst control of 
corruption) to 2.5 (best). World Bank (2013b).
Economic growth rate (%): Annual percentage change in expenditure-side real GDP at chained 
purchasing power parities, in 2005 $US. Feenstra et al. (2013).
Infant mortality rate: Number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births.
World Bank (2013a).
Population density: Population per squared kilometer of land area. World Bank (2013a).
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